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COMMENTS
ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA: THE 1979 AMENDMENTS USHER
IN A NEW ERA IN CITY-COUNTY RELATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Annexation1 has been the most common method of adjusting local gov-
ernment boundaries in the United States since the 1850's.2 This wide-
spread acceptance of annexation, however, has not created uniform proce-
dures for initiating and completing annexation proceedings. Rather, the
process of annexation varies considerably from state to state.3
The Virginia annexation process 4 can best be understood in light of two
principles - one which forms the foundation of local government law in
Virginia; the other which forms the foundation of annexation law in
Virginia. 5
The first principle requires statewide city-county separation.6 In Vir-
1. The term annexation or annex is derived from the Latin word "annectere," meaning to
tie or bind to. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 81 (5th ed. 1979). In the context of contemporary
local government law, annexation has been defined as the acquisition or absorption by a
municipality or town of nearby unincorporated territory or land. M. Mashaw, Virginia's Re-
vised Annexation Policy- An Analysis of the 1979 Compromise and Its Implications 7 (Aug.
1980) (unpublished master's thesis on file at the Commission on Local Government).
2. See M. Mashaw, supra note 1.
3. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON Crry-CouNTY RELATIONSHIPS, REPORTED TO THE
GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 27, at 26 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as STUART COMMISSION]. In general, there are five basic means by which annexation
may be accomplished: (1) legislative determination - annexation through special act of the
state legislature; (2) popular determination - annexation contingent upon one or more
forms of popular participation and/or approval, e.g. a referendum; (3) municipal determina-
tion - annexation through unilateral municipal action; (4) judicial determination - annex-
ation submitted to and approved by the judiciary; and (5) quasi-legislative determination -
annexation decided by an independent administrative body. Most states use more than one
of these procedures. Id. See also 2 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MumIPAL COPORATIONS §
7.14 (3d ed. 1979); C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LocAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 29 (1980); 1 C.
SANDS & M. LmONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 8.30 (1981).
4. The statutory procedure for annexation in Virginia is found at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-
1032 to -1058 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
5. See generally Stuart, The Commission on City-County Relationships: A New Look At
An Old Dilemma, 52 U. Va. Newsletter No. 3 (Nov. 1975) (discussing the findings of the
Commission on City-County Relationships); M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 11-14.
6. City-county separation on a statewide basis is unique toVirginia. See C. BAIN, "A BODY
INCORPORATE" - THE EVOLUTION OF CITY-CouNTY SEPARATION IN VIRGINIA ix, 23 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as C. BAIN, "A BoDY INcORPORATE"]; C. BAIN, ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA iX
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ginia, cities and counties are independent of one another7 both politically
and geographically,8 which avoids the inefficient overlapping of local gov-
ernment jurisdictions found in other states.' This system of separation
has been praised for its logic, but in the context of annexation, has often
caused strained relations between local governments because the annex-
ing municipality" takes land which previously belonged to the county.1
The second principle provides for judicial determination of annexa-
tion. 1 2 Virginia requires that annexation proceedings be conducted by the
courts in accordance with general law. 3 Judicial determination of annexa-
tion was designed to remove purely political motivation from considera-
tion in annexation cases, ensuring that an impartial body capable of equi-
table resolution of complex, highly technical issues would make the
ultimate determination."'
These two principles provide the legal framework within which Vir-
ginia's annexation laws operated in the past and continue to operate to-
day. 15 The remainder of this comment will deal with the political and
legal climate which resulted in the adoption of the 1979 amendments,"
(1966) [hereinafter cited as C. BAIN, ANNEXATION]; see also Martin & Buchholtz, Annexa-
tion - Virginia's Dilemma, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 241 (1967); Note, Securing a Valid
Annexation in Virginia: State and Federal Requirements, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 557, 558
(1976).
7. See VA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
8. See Note, supra note 6, at 559.
9. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 49.
10. The principle of city-county separation applies only to municipalities. Towns in Vir-
ginia are not separate and distinct from the counties in which they lie. See VA. CoNsT. art
VII, § 1; C. BAIN, "A BODY INCORPORATE," supra note 6, at 27-28.
11. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 49; see also Bain, Annexation: Virginia's
Not-So-Judicial System, 15 PuB. AD. REv. 251 (1955). For an in-depth discussion of the
etiology of the principle of city-county separation in Virginia, see C. BAIN, "A BODY INCOR-
PORATE," supra note 6. See also Martin & Buchholtz, supra note 6, at 242-43; Note, supra
note 6, at 559-60.
12. Prior to 1902, annexation in Virginia was carried out by the legislature in the form of
special acts. See C. BAIN, ANNEXATION, supra note 6, at 1. The Virginia Constitution of 1902
abandoned this method of annexation and adopted a judicial determination of annexation in
1904. See Bain, Terms and Conditions of Annexation Under the 1952 Statute, 41 VA. L.
REv. 1129, 1129 (1955). This remains the method of determining annexation today. See VA.
CONST. art. VII, § 2; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1032 to -1058 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cune. Supp.
1983).
13. The authority of the General Assembly to prescribe by general law the criteria and
procedure for annexing territory is expressly set out in article VII, section 2 of the Virginia
Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that "[tihe General Assembly shall provide
by general law for the organization, government, powers, change of boundaries, consolida-
tion and dissolution of counties, cities, towns, and regional governments." (emphasis added).
14. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 33-35.
15. For a detailed discussion of the legal framework of annexation, see C. BAIN, "A BODY
INCORPORATE," supra note 6; C. BAIN, ANNEXATION, supra note 6.
16. See infra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
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the 1979 amendments themselves, 17 and an assessment of how the
amendments have worked in practice.1 8
II. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL CLIMATE LEADING UP TO THE 1979
AMENDMENTS
A. The Strain on Local Government Relations
During the latter half of the twentieth century, Virginia made the tran-
sition from a state with a predominantly rural population to one with a
predominantly urban population.' 9 This demographic shift steadily in-
creased the need for urban services and imposed heavier responsibilities
on local governments.2 0
Counties responded by providing their inhabitants with a greater num-
ber of urban services.2 ' The cost of providing these services made the
counties increasingly apprehensive about losing territory through the an-
nexation process because any resulting decrease in the county's tax base
would hinder the county's ability to pay for services in the remainder of
the county.2
2
Cities also responded with increased services.23 However, paying for
those services became more difficult in cities where traditional revenues
from local property taxes failed to raise sufficient income to cover the
service needs of their residents. 2" The population of Virginia's cities con-
sists of a statistically higher proportion of citizens in need of a high level
of services than does the population in its counties. 25 Further, state aid to
localities inequitably favored counties over cities in such areas as funding
for sheriff and police departments and the construction and maintenance
of highways.26 Thus, Virginia cities came to view annexation as a method
to acquire much needed revenue to remain a fiscally viable unit of
government.
27
This situation created conflict between cities and counties whenever
the county was threatened with annexation from an adjacent municipal-
17. See infra notes 38-99 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 100-210 and accompanying text.
19. Talcott, Annexation: The Problem, and Some Solutions, Richmond News-Leader,
Jan. 16, 1979, at 10, col. 3.
20. Id.
21. See M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 18.
22. Id. at 20; see also Michie & Mashaw, Annexation and State Aid to Localities: A
Compromise Is Reached, 55 U. Va. Newsletter No. 11, at 42 (July 1979).
23. See M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 16-18.
24. Id.; Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42.
25. See M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 16-18 (indicating city populations include a higher
percentage of the poor, the elderly, and minorities).
26. Id. at 21; Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42.
27. See STUART COMAnSSION, supra note 3, at 28.
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ity. The resulting strain on local government relations interfered with the
resolution of problems that required regional consideration and coopera-
tion.2 8 In addition, annexation proceedings became increasingly costly in
terms of time away from more productive pursuits and in terms of a drain
on already low revenue resources.2"
Finally, the sociological element of civic pride has played a role in the
strain on local government relations.30 Citizens who have identified with
one local government all of their lives and who have a strong sense of
community pride often resist the annexation of their community by a
municipality.
B. The Stuart Commission
These factors culminated in the creation of various study commissions
charged with the task of proposing solutions to the problems posed by
annexation.31 In 1971, the General Assembly imposed a moratorium on
city-initiated annexations and on the incorporation of new cities.32 In
conjunction with this moratorium, the General Assembly created the
Commission on City-County Relationships (the Stuart Commission) to
study annexation.3 3 The General Assembly hoped that by staying pending
annexation suits, the legal and political climate would be conducive to
proper legislative review.34
The Stuart Commission reported its findings to the General Assembly
in 1975.15 Yet, it was not until 1979 that the General Assembly responded
to the various competing interests involved and developed a package of
28. See M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 20-21 (citing examples of problems requiring re-
gional consideration and cooperation which include water and sewage treatment, public
transportation, and maintenance and development of libraries).
29. Id. at 15; Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42. See generally STUART COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 28.
30. See C. BAIN, "A BODY INCORPORATE," supra note 6, at 98.
31. See Talcott, supra note 19 (citing studies prior to 1970 including the Commission to
Study Urban Growth (1951), the Study of Governmental Subdivision in Virginia (1956), the
Study of Consolidation of Local Government Services (1957), the Study of Annexation and
Consolidation (1963), the Virginia Metropolitan Areas Study Commission (1967), and the
Richmond Boundary Expansion Study Commission (1969)).
32. The moratorium only applied to cities above a population of 125,000 and their adjoin-
ing counties. It was to run for a period of five years. In 1972, the moratorium was broadened
to cover all counties and cities, with the exception of those localities with pending annexa-
tion suits, and was extended through June 30, 1977. When the General Assembly failed to
reach agreement in 1977, a ten-year moratorium was imposed. The moratorium was lifted on
July 1, 1980 as a result of the passage of the 1979 amendments. See generally STUART COM-
MISSION, supra note 3, at 8; M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 25-26; see also 1971-72 Op. Va.
Att'y Gen. 15-16 (affirming the validity of the moratorium).
33. 1971 Va. Acts, ch. 234.
34. Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 41.
35. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 3.
legislation which addressed the problems plaguing Virginia's local govern-
ments.36 One newspaper termed the legislation the "most significant legis-
lation of the 1979 Session."3
III. THE 1979 AMENDMENTS
The 1979 amendments consisted of three separate pieces of legislation
- House Bills 599, 602 and 603.38 House Bills 599 and 602 dealt prima-
rily with adjustments in provisions for state aid to localities,39 while
House Bill 603 contained a significant revision of the annexation
process. 40
The major areas of revision in House Bill 603 were: (1) the adoption of
provisions to allow a county to apply for either complete or partial immu-
nity from annexation, (2) the creation of a Commission on Local Govern-
ment, an agency charged with the task of promoting the state's interest in
annexation proceedings and insuring the continued viability of Virginia's
political subdivisions, and (3) the adoption of specific amendments to the
annexation statute itself.
4 1
A. Immunity from Annexation
1. Complete or Total Immunity
A county which has a population of 20,000 persons and a density of 300
persons per square mile, or a population of 50,000 persons and a density
of 140 persons per square mile may petition the circuit court of that
county for an order declaring the county immune from city-initiated an-
nexation and from the incorporation of new cities within its boundaries. 42
36. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 85.
37. Senate Approves Annexation Plans, Roanoke Times and World News, Feb. 13, 1979,
at Al, quoted in M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 38.
38. 1979 Va. Acts, chs. 83-85. See M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 25-37; Michie & Mashaw,
supra note 22, at 41.
39. The purpose of House Bill 599 was to increase the amount of financial aid to munici-
palities in order to reduce the need for annexation. Aid was increased in such areas as (1)
operating expenses for local police departments, (2) salaries of circuit court judges, (3) sala-
ries and expenses of Commonwealth's attorneys, and (4) hospitalization and treatment of
welfare recipients. The purpose of House Bill 602 was to allocate the funds available for
highway construction and maintenance more equitably among cities and counties, thereby
reducing the municipalities' need for annexation. See generally M. Mashaw, supra note 1,
at 26-31; Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42.
40. See M. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 31-37; Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42.
41. Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.21 (Repl. Vol. 1981). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
977.23(B) (Repl. Vol. 1981) (one exception to the immunity from incorporation of new cities
is a grandfather clause stating that any town which on July 1, 1979 possessed a population
in excess of five thousand persons and was located in a county eligible for total immunity
retained its right to become a city).
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If the county meets these criteria, immunity is automatic and the circuit
court cannot deny the county's petition.43 Moreover, once a county is
granted immunity, it becomes permanent."'
The immunity provisions represent a major policy shift in annexation
law.45 Prior to 1979, the policy of the state had been that rural areas
should be governed by county governments and urban areas should be
governed by city governments.4 This division of labor was based on a
belief that city governments could best provide urban services. Neverthe-
less, as counties became increasingly urban in character and demon-
strated an ability to deliver urban services, this policy lost much of its
logic and support. It became apparent that annexation was no longer ap-
propriate for those urban counties which were capable of delivering urban
services as efficiently as the cities.47 Hence, by sanctioning county govern-
ment of urban areas, the immunity provisions signaled the abandonment
of the previous policy. 48
The provisions for total immunity do not bar either citizen-initiated
annexation49 or town-initiated annexation.50 Citizen-initiated annexations
are not considered to be a threat to the county so long as the county
remains prosperous and provides a sufficient level of services. Similarly,
town-initiated annexations are not considered to be a threat to the county
because towns are not independent of counties. 1
Nine counties acquired eligibility for total immunity when the legisla-
tion went into effect in 1979.52 To date, all but two of those counties have
applied for and received immunity. 3 Should all nine counties ultimately
43. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.21 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
44. Id. § 15.1-977.22:2 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
45. See 1976-77 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 8 (stating that there was initially some concern that
the immunity provisions may have been an unconstitutional special act in violation of VA.
CONST. art. VII, § 2, but the Attorney General of Virginia has opined otherwise).
46. See, e.g., City of Roanoke v. County of Roanoke, 204 Va. 157, 167, 129 S.E.2d 711, 717
(1963); County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 1044-45, 45 S.E.2d 136, 141
(1947). This policy is commonly referred to as the Staples Doctrine after Justice Abram P.
Staples who wrote the opinion in County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth. See generally C.
BAIN, ANNEXATION, supra note 6, at 97-99.
47. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 25-28.
48. See County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. 62, 76, 294 S.E.2d 825,
831-32 (1982).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.23(A) (Repl. Vol. 1981). Citizen-initiated annexations are
those filed by county residents in the area to be annexed pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
1034 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
50. Id. § 15.1-977.23(A) (Repl. Vol. 1981). Town-initiated annexations are those filed pur-
suant to VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1033 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
51. See VA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
52. See Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42.
53. Interview with Ted McCormack, Assistant to the Director, Commission on Local Gov-
ernment (Aug. 4, 1983).
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be granted immunity, a total of fifteen cities in Virginia would be
affected.54
2. Partial Immunity
A county which does not meet the criteria for complete immunity may
petition the circuit court of the county for an order declaring a part or
parts of the county immune from city-initiated annexation and from the
incorporation of new cities. The court will grant partial immunity if it
finds that appropriate urban-type services are provided to the area.5
In considering whether such services are provided, the court is in-
structed to consider the type and level of services in the area; the
county's efforts to comply with the state's environmental protection, pub-
lic planning, education, public transportation and housing policies; the
extent to which a community of interest exists between the part of the
county for which immunity is sought and both the remainder of the
county and the municipality; and whether either party has arbitrarily re-
fused to cooperate in the joint provision of services. 6
The court's power to grant partial immunity is limited in those situa-
tions where partial immunity, if granted, would result in "substantially
foreclosing" a city of less than 100,000 people from expanding its bounda-
ries by annexation. 57
Finally, a 1983 amendment gives the court the express authority to
award partial immunity to a greater or smaller area than the area
requested.5 8
B. The Commission on Local Government
Perhaps the most far-reaching change in the annexation laws brought
about by the 1979 amendments was the creation of the Commission on
Local Government.5 The purpose of the Commission is to "help ensure
that all of [Virginia's] counties, cities and towns are maintained as viable
communities in which their citizens can live."16 0 The Commission consists
of five members appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the General
54. See Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22, at 42.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.22:1 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
56. Id. The report and recommendation of the Commission on Local Government analyz-
ing the partial immunity request is required evidence in the proceeding. Id. However, re-
ports of the Commission are not binding on the courts. See infra note 73.
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.22:1 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
58. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 217 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.22:1 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
Prior to this amendment, there was some uncertainty whether the court had that power. See
infra text accompanying note 203.
59. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-945.1 to -945.7 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
60. Id. § 15.1-945.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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Assembly.6
The Commission's responsibilities are extensive. It is responsible for re-
viewing and assessing petitions for annexation, partial immunity, the es-
tablishment of towns, the incorporation of new cities, transitions from
towns to cities, and voluntary boundary adjustments. 62 The Commission
also serves as a mediator between local governments involved in an an-
nexation or immunity dispute.6 '
The procedure for initiating annexation suits was altered substantially
by the creation of the Commission. Previously, municipalities desiring to
annex a portion of a neighboring county began by filing a petition in the
circuit court of the county where the territory to be annexed was located.
Upon the parties' request, a special annexation court would be created to
determine whether the annexation was "necessary and expedient" accord-
ing to law.64 Today, as a consequence of both the 1979 and 1980 amend-
ments, no court action may be filed without first notifying the Commis-
sion.6 5 Once notified, the Commission investigates and analyzes the
proposed action, and reports back to the parties within six months.66 A
written report which outlines the Commission's findings of fact and rec-
ommendations is issued to the parties.67 The report must be based on the
criteria and standards established by law for the particular type of peti-
tion involved.6 The Commission cannot issue a report until it holds pub-
lic hearings on the matter69 and no court action may be filed until the
Commission issues its report.7 0
Once the Commission issues its report, the procedure remains much the
same as it was prior to the 1979 and 1980 amendments. The party seeking
annexation or immunity must petition the circuit court to create a special
61. Id. § 15.1-945.2. Terms are for five years and each term is staggered so that one term
will expire each year. Id.
62. Id. § 15.1-945.3(H). The Commission has no authority to review petitions for total
immunity since these are granted automatically once the required statutory criteria are
shown to have been met. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
63. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-945.3(G).
64. See id. §§ 15.1-1032 to -1058 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
65. Id. § 15.1-945.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 15.1-945.7(B).
68. Id. The criteria and standards for annexation proceedings are found at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 15.1-1041 to -1042 (Repl. Vol. 1981). The criteria and standards for immunity proceed-
ings are found at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-977.21 (total immunity), -977.22:1 (partial immu-
nity). The criteria and standards for other proceedings are beyond the scope of this
comment.
69. Id. § 15.1-945.7(B) (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983). Except for hearings or meet-
ings, the provisions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, id. §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1, do
not apply to the Commission. However, since the Commission is a state agency, the provi-
sions of the Virginia Administrative Process Act, id. §§ 9-6.14:1 to .14:21, do apply.
70. Id. § 15.1-945.7(A).
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annexation court.71 In proceedings before the annexation court, the report
of the Commission is admissible into evidence.7 2 The court must consider
the report but is not bound by the Commission's findings or
recommendations.7
3
In addition to issuing reports to the parties and the court in annexation
and immunity proceedings, the Commission retains the authority to me-
diate disputes between political subdivisions of the state.74 The Commis-
sion's most active role in the annexation process to date has been in the
area of mediation.7 5 Its authority is exercised by one of two methods. The
first method allows the Commission to initiate attempts to mediate settle-
ments of disputes which are referred to it for formal review. 76 The media-
tion can be conducted either by members of the Commission or, with
agreement of the parties, by the appointment of an independent
mediator.77
The second method allows the parties involved in an annexation or par-
tial immunity dispute to request that the Commission serve as mediator
of the dispute. Any party may make this request by serving notice on the
Commission of the party's desire to negotiate a settlement.7 8 If the parties
desire to negotiate without mediation from the Commission, the latter
must nevertheless be advised of the progress of the negotiations. The
Commission is required to terminate the negotiations if, after a hearing,
the Commission finds that none of the parties is willing to continue to
negotiate, or if it finds that three months have elapsed with no substan-
tial progress towards settlement. In any event, negotiations are to cease
twelve months from the time the initial notice of the desire to negotiate
was filed with the Commission.7 9
C. Amendments to the Annexation Statute
In addition to the immunity provisions and the creation of the Coin-
71. See id. §§ 15.1-1033, -1034, -1038, -1168.
72. Id. § 15.1-945.7(B).
73. Commission reports are advisory only. See id. § 15.1-945.7(C).
74. See id. § 15.1-945.7(A), (E).
75. For example, since 1981 independent mediators were appointed by the Commission in
at least four instances - Fredericksburg-Spotsylvania County, County of Augusta (partial
immunity action), Emporia-Greensville County, and Waynesboro-Augusta County. In each
instance some type of settlement agreement was reached.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-945.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
77. Id. Negotiations may be conducted in executive or closed session. Further, offers and
statements made during the negotiations are not admissible in court and the Commission
cannot report them. Id.
78. See id. § 15.1-945.7(E). Such a request may be made before or after the filing of an
annexation or partial immunity suit in court. If the request is made after filing, the annexa-
tion or partial immunity suit will be stayed while negotiations are in progress. Id.
79. Id.
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mission on Local Government, the 1979 amendments revised and reen-
acted the existing procedure for judical determination of annexation.8
One of the most significant changes was the codification of the factors
used by the court in determining whether an annexation is necessary and
expedient.
8 2
The statutory standard by which all annexations are judged in Virginia
is the test of necessity and expediency.82 The terms are to be used con-
junctively and not in the alternative; thus, a proposed annexation must
be shown to be both necessary and expedient.83 In considering the neces-
sity for and expediency of annexation, the annexation court must
consider
the best interests of the people of the county and the city or town, services
to be rendered and needs of the people of the area proposed to be annexed,
the best interests of the people in the remaining portion of the county and
the best interests of the State in promoting strong and viable units of
government.84
The 1979 amendments added the state-interest standard to the annexa-
tion test and for the first time codified the factors to be used by the court
in making its determination of necessity and expediency.8 5 With the ex-
ception of two of these factors,8 the codification did not work a substan-
tive change in annexation law. Courts had always considered these types
of factors in determining the necessity for and expediency of annexa-
tion.87 But, the purpose of the codification was two-fold. First, the intent
80. See id. §§ 15.1-1032 to -1058.
81. See id. § 15.1-1041.
82. Id. See also County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 1045-46, 45
S.E.2d 136, 142 (1947) (defining the statutory standard); Martin & Buchholtz, supra note 6,
at 260.
83. See, e.g., City of Falls Church v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 193 Va. 112,
115-16, 68 S.E.2d 96, 98-99 (1951); see also Johnston v. County of Fairfax, 211 Va. 378, 382,
177 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1970) (stating that the burden of proving necessity and expediency is
on the proponents of the annexation).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(b) (Repl. Vol. 1981). The 1979 amendments added a
"state-interest" standard in the last clause by instructing the court to consider the best
interests of the state. See County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. 62, 74-75,
85, 294 S.E.2d 825, 830-31, 837 (1982) (showing an application of the state-interest test).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(bl) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
86. Id. § 15.1-1041(bl)(iii) (stating that the court shall consider to the extent relevant
"[tihe need for urban services in the area proposed for annexation, the level of services
provided in the county, city or town, and the ability of such county, city or town to provide
services in the area sought to be annexed"), (bl)(v) (stating that the court shall also con-
sider "[a]ny arbitrary refusal by the governing body of the petitioner or the county whose
territory is sought to be annexed to enter into cooperative agreements providing for joint
activities which would have benefited citizens of both political subdivisions").
87. See, e.g., City of Roanoke v. County of Roanoke, 214 Va. 216, 227, 198 S.E.2d 780, 788
(1973) (a city's need for additional vacant land for residential, commercial, and industrial
development is a factor to be considered in an annexation proceeding); Higgins v. City of
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was to make the factors much more precise by spelling them out for the
parties and the court. This would refine the issues in annexation proceed-
ings, thus reducing the proceedings' length and cost. Second, prior to
1979, the courts were not required to consider all the factors in one pro-
ceeding. The result was a shifting emphasis on a variety of factors, leav-
ing the annexation process without a great deal of consistency or struc-
ture. The 1979 amendments sought to remedy these defects.8
The composition of the annexation court is the topic of another signifi-
cant amendment to the annexation statute. The statute requires a special
three-judge annexation court for all annexation and immunity proceed-
ings, except those proceedings dealing with total county immunity. 9 It
further provides that annexation courts will be selected from a panel of
fifteen circuit court judges chosen by the Virginia Supreme Court. 0 The
1979 amendments provide that no judge will be allowed to hear disputes
involving annexation of territory within his circuit."' The purpose of this
provision is to avoid the charges of bias and conflict of interest that had
occurred under the previous law, which required that one judge on the
panel be from the same circuit as the territory to be annexed.9 2
The 1979 amendments increased from five to ten years the time limita-
tion between one city-initiated annexation attempt and another.93 There-
fore, a city that institutes one annexation suit against a county may not
bring another suit for ten years from the effective date of the annexation.
If the annexation is denied, the ten-year period begins to run either from
the date of the final order denying annexation or, if appealed to the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, from the date of the supreme court's final order,9 4
Roanoke, 212 Va. 399, 400, 184 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1971) (a city's ability to provide services to
the area to be annexed is a factor to be considered); City of Alexandria v. County of Fairfax,
212 Va. 437, 441, 184 S.E.2d 758, 761 (1971) (a city's need to expand its tax base is not by
itself grounds for justifying annexation); Johnston v. County of Fairfax, 211 Va. 378, 383,
177 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1970) (the court considered the need for urban services in the area to
be annexed and the comparative ability of the city and county to provide same); County of
Fairfax v. Town of Fairfax, 201 Va. 362, 368, 111 S.E.2d 428, 433 (1959) (the court consid-
ered the adverse effect of annexation on the county as a factor); City of Falls Church v.
Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 193 Va. 112, 118, 68 S.E.2d 96, 100 (1951) (the
community of interest among the affected area is entitled to consideration).
88. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 41-42.
89. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1168 to -1170 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
90. Id. § 15.1-1168.
91. Id.
92. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 41.
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1055 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
94. Id. This does not apply if the city moves to dismiss the case before a hearing on the
merits. In such an instance, the city may refile after five years. Nor does the ten-year wait-
ing period apply if the previous petition was dismissed due to a procedural defect, lack of
jurisdiction, or any defense not reaching the merits of the case. Id. The present provisions
eliminate an ambiguity that existed in previous statutes concerning when the time period
begins to run on denial of annexation. See 1964-65 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 5.
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The 1979 amendments also included provisions for economic growth-
sharing agreements between local governments.9 5 Under a growth-sharing
agreement, the city agrees to relinquish its authority to initiate annexa-
tion proceedings against all or any portion of the county for a given pe-
riod of time. In exchange, the county agrees to share with the city the
benefits of economic growth in the two jurisdictions."6 These agreements
were viewed as an alternative to judicial annexation proceedings. 7 How-
ever, the relevant provisions of the statute were repealed in 198311 and
replaced with new provisions for voluntary agreements which were much
broader and more inclusive than the previous provisions.9 These volun-
tary agreements are the subject of the next section.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 1979 AMENDMENTS IN OPERATION
A. The New Trend Towards Voluntary Agreements in Annexation
Cases
Prior to the creation of the Commission on Local Government, there
was no state machinery for resolving annexation disputes short of a
lengthy, expensive court battle. This situation and its associated
problems created the political and legal climate that led up to the adop-
tion of the 1979 amendments. 0 0 Today, the Commission plays a central
role in resolving annexation disputes. Furthermore, both the immunity
provisions ° 1 and the amendments to the annexation statute 02 are
designed to fit modern local government conditions and to streamline the
annexation procedure.
After four years in operation, the results indicate a renewed coopera-
tion between political subdivisions of the state. A trend toward voluntary
settlement of annexation disputes appears to have developed. The overall
numbers are impressive. Of nine cases reviewed and reported by the
Commission, six cases included negotiated settlement agreements.'0
95. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1166 to -1167 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
96. Id. § 15.1-1166.
97. See Michie & Mashaw, supra note 22.
98. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 523.
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1167.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
100. See supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
103. See COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF BUENA VISTA -
COUNTY OF ROCKBRIDGE ANNEXATION AGREEMENT (June 1983); COMMISSION ON LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG - COUNTY OF JAMES CITY ANNEXATION
AGREEMENT (June 1983); COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF EMPO-
RIA - COUNTY OF GREENSVILLE ANNEXATION AGREEMENT (May 1983); COMMISSION ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE TOWN OF LEESBURG - COUNTY OF LOUDON ANNEXATION
AGREEMENT (March 1983); COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF
FREDERICKSBURG - COUNTY OF SPOTSYLVANIA ANNEXATION AND IMMUNITY AGREEMENT (June
[Vol. 17:819
ANNEXATION
1. Pending Unreported Cases Illustrative of the New Trend
The case of City of Buena Vista - County of Rockbridge04 is a typical
example of the type of agreement being reached today. The City of Buena
Vista sought to annex 3.63 square miles of territory in Rockbridge
County. After several months of negotiations, the parties reached a settle-
ment agreement on June 2, 1982.105
The agreement called for the annexation by Buena Vista of 3.75 square
miles of territory located in Rockbridge County in exchange for an agree-
ment by the city not to initiate another annexation proceeding against
the county for twenty years following the effective date of the annexation.
The agreement also included a number of utility provisions. Additionally,
a supplemental agreement established the compensation to be paid to
Rockbridge County for loss of net tax revenue.106
The Commission reviewed the agreement and endorsed it without fur-
ther comment. The Commission also specifically recommended that the
annexation be approved by the court.107
The importance of the Buena Vista case is reflected by the following
comment of the Commission: "The Commission has not sought to analyze
critically the annexation as a separate action, and nothing in this report
should be construed as an endorsement of the annexation distinct from
the, agreement of which it is part.""0" The meaning of this statement is
not entirely clear. If the Commission meant that the annexation would
not have been approved as necessary and expedient had it been a sepa-
rate action, then the presence of the agreement should not have made the
Commission approve it. The inference is that the Commission lowered the
standard for proving necessity and expediency in light of the county's ac-
quiescence to the annexation. If this is true, the Commission deferred to
what the parties considered necessary and expedient. However, that is
outside the Commission's statutory power.109 The Commission is to re-
1982); COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE TOWN OF KENBRIDGE - COUNTY
OF LUNENBURG ANNEXATION AGREEMENT (October 1981) (The six agreements involving nego-
tiated settlements.).
For three cases which did not result in negotiated settlements, see COMMISSION ON LocAL
GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF WAYNESBORO - COUNTY OF AUGUSTA ANNEXATION Ac-
TION (July 1983); COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE COUNTY OF AUGUSTA
PARTIAL IMMUNITY ACTION (December 1982); COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON
THE CITY OF HARRISONBURG - COUNTY OF ROCKINGHAM ANNEXATION CASE (February 1981).
104. COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF BUENA VISTA - COUNTY
OF ROCKBRIDGE ANNEXATION AGREEMENT (June 1983).
105. Id. at 1-2.
106. Id. at app. A.
107. Id. at 32-33.
108. Id. at 33.
109. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-945.1 to -945.7 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cure. Supp. 1983).
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view proposed annexations in accordance with the criteria established by
law, °10 and a voluntary agreement is not a factor to be considered.",
This is not to say that what the Commission did was not in the best
interests of either the parties or the state. The agreement was in the
county's interest since the city cannot initiate another annexation pro-
ceeding for twenty years, ten years beyond the statutory limitation. 1 2
Rather, the point is that the Commission has no statutory authority at
present to consider a voluntary settlement agreement between localities
as a factor in determining whether an annexation is necessary and expedi-
ent. 1 3 But it seems reasonable that the Commission should have author-
ity to determine the best interests of the parties. A solution to this prob-
lem would be to amend the Code of Virginia 1'4 to allow the courts and the
Commission to consider the presence or absence of a voluntary agreement
as a factor in determining the necessity and expediency of a proposed
annexation.
Upon the petition of the parties in Buena Vista, the Circuit Court of
Rockingham County appointed a three-judge annexation court to review
the annexation and agreement. A trial date has not been set."5
A second case is City of Williamsburg - County of James City."8 The
City of Williamsburg sought to annex a portion of James City County.
The agreement signed on April 7, 1982 provided for the annexation of
3.88 square miles of territory in the county in exchange for an agreement
by Williamsburg to refrain from attempting another annexation for
fifteen years following the annexation."'
The primary significance of this case involves a provision in the agree-
ment which commits both jurisdictions to oppose all citizen-initiated an-
nexations for fifteen years following the effective date of the agreement." 8
Some of the county citizens who lived outside the proposed annexation
area, but who desired to be included in the annexed area, objected to this
provision in the agreement. The citizens argued that the agreement was
not in their best interest because it foreclosed all possibility of annexation
110. Id. § 15.1-945.7(B).
111. See id. § 15.1-1041 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
112. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
114. The section of the Virginia Code which would require amending is § 15.1-1041(bl).
115. The three-judge annexation court was appointed by the Virginia Supreme Court on
July 2, 1983, pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1168 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983)
The members of the court are Kenneth Trabue, C.J., Wiley R. Wright and M.M. Long, Jr.,
J.J.
116. COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG -
COUNTY OF JAMES CITY ANNEXATION AGREEMENT (June 1983).
117. Id. at 1-2.
118. Id. at app. A.
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in the county for an excessive length of time.1 "
The Commission rejected this plea and approved the agreement."' Al-
though the Commission report does not reflect it, the citizens had raised a
substantive attack on the validity of those provisions. Under the Dillon
Rule of strict construction, local governments may only exercise those
powers that are expressly conferred or which are necessarily or fairly im-
plied from the terms of a statute.'2 ' The economic growth-sharing statute,
the authority under which the agreement was executed, did not expressly
or necessarily or fairly imply the power to reject all citizen-initiated an-
nexation attempts for any period of time.'22
The legal problem spawned by the Williamsburg case was resolved by a
1983 amendment to the Virginia Code.' 23 As of July 1, 1983, counties,
cities and towns were given express authority to voluntarily agree to re-
ject citizen-initiated annexations for the period of time specified by the
parties.'24
Although the Williamsburg-James City agreement antedated this
amendment, all prior voluntary agreements are retrospectively validated
by another 1983 amendment.12 5 This latter amendment repealed the eco-
nomic growth-sharing statute and substituted new provisions governing
the entry into and review of voluntary agreements.
2. Court and Commission Review of Voluntary Agreements
The voluntary agreements to date that have been reviewed by the
Commission on Local Government were entered into under the authority
of the economic growth-sharing provisions of the 1979 amendments.'
These provisions proved to be inadequate because, although the Commis-
sion was given broad authority to negotiate or mediate settlements be-
tween jurisdictions, once the agreement was signed the Commission lack-
ed statutory authority to review the agreements. 27 Furthermore, the
economic growth-sharing provisions allowed the Commission to partici-
pate and assist in the negotiations only if requested to do so by the locali-
119. Id. at 53.
120. Id. at 54.
121. See Tabler v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 221 Va. 200, 202, 269 S.E.2d
358, 359 (1980) (discussing Virginia's application of the Dillon Rule concerning legislative
power of local governing bodies).
122. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1166 to -1167 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cure. Supp. 1983).
123. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 594 (codified at VA. CODE ANN § 15.1-1034 (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
124. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1034(C) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See also id. § 15.1-1167.1(2).
125. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 523 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1167.1 (Cur. Supp. 1983)).
See also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1167.1(7).
126. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1166 to -1167 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
127. See id. § 15.1-945.7(A), (E) (stating the Commission's authority to negotiate and
mediate settlements).
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ties.12 Thus, if the parties wanted to enter into an agreement without the
Commission's assistance, that was their perogative. To date, two agree-
ments have excluded the Commission - those of the City of Charlottes-
ville - Albemarle County and the City of Radford - Pulaski County. 2 '
Not only were the economic growth-sharing provisions inadequate,130
but no mention was made of the Commission's authority to review settle-
ment agreements in any other provision of the 1979 amendments. The
only express authority given to the Commission is that of reviewing all
petitions for annexation, partial immunity, and other status or boundary
changes.' Thus, the Commission may properly review only that part of
an agreement which pertains to a proposed annexation or other matters
within its express authority.
The Commission's position has been that the legislature intended that
voluntary agreements be critically reviewed by the Commission. 32 The
argument was two-fold: first, because the Commission had not been spe-
cifically forbidden to review voluntary agreements and had been author-
ized to mediate settlements, there was an inference that the General As-
sembly intended that once the Commission had mediated a settlement it
should review the settlement critically; and second, because the General
Assembly had seen fit to give the Commission express authority to review
town-county agreements and to make a critical assessment of their provi-
sions, there was an indication of legislative intent to confer authority on
the Commission to generally review all agreements. 3'
The first argument has more merit than the second. In determining the
legislative intent concerning the presence and scope of Commission re-
view, the applicable principle of statutory construction dictates that re-
medial statutes are to be construed liberally to achieve the purposes of
the legislation.2 4 Since the 1979 amendments were remedial in nature,
they should be construed liberally.3 5 Therefore, it can be inferred that
the legislature intended the Commission to have the authority to criti-
cally review voluntary settlement agreements.
The second argument does not fare as well. Although the Virginia Code
128. Id. § 15.1-1167 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
129. Interview with Ted McCormack, Assistant to the Director, Commission on Local
Government (Aug. 4, 1983).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-945.7(A), (E) (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
131. Id. § 15.1-945.7(A).
132. Commission on Local Government, Review of Negotiated Annexation Settlements
(undated internal memorandum).
133. Id. at 1-3.
134. See Scott v. Sylvester, 220 Va. 182, 185, 257 S.E.2d 774, 775-76 (1979); Virginia
Brewing Co. v. Webber, 167 Va. 67, 72, 187 S.E. 447, 449 (1936).
135. See 1982-83 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 151 (stating that in his opinion the 1979 amend-
ments were remedial in nature).
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gives the Commission express authority to review all town-county agree-
ments,1 36 this alone does not confer authority as to agreements generally.
Rather, an application of the maxim of statutory construction - expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius37 - would dictate the opposite result.138
The General Assembly resolved all doubts as to the scope of Commis-
sion review in 1983 by repealing the economic growth-sharing provisions
and enacting new provisions which expressly give the Commission the au-
thority to review voluntary settlement agreements. 3 9 The statute applies
retrospectively, thus validating the Commission's review of prior agree-
ments as well as those which, by the choice of the parties, were not re-
viewed by the Commission,'4
Not only was the Commission's scope of review a significant omission in
the 1979 amendments, but the scope of judicial review of voluntary agree-
ments was also a significant omission. Only one voluntary agreement has
been presented to an annexation court for review since the passage of the
1979 amendments and the court held that it did not have the jurisdiction
to review it."4
In City of Fredericksburg v. County of Spotsylvania,'4' the parties en-
tered into an annexation and immunity agreement on December 22, 1981.
The agreement was reviewed by the Commission in its report of June,
1982.,1 The agreement provided that Fredericksburg would annex 4.6
square miles of territory in the county in exchange for the city's agree-
ment not to initiate its own annexation or support any citizen-initiated
annexations for a period of twenty-five years following the agreement. 44
The agreement was presented to the annexation court for approval and
in a Memorandum Opinion the court held that it did not have the juris-
diction to approve or disapprove of the voluntary agreement provisions."
5
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-945.7(A), (E) (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
137. Literally meaning "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S
LAW DICToNARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
138. The express authority conferred by VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1058.2 (Repl. Vol. 1981) to
review town-county agreements coupled with a lack of similar authority to generally review
agreements implies that the General Assembly sought to exclude such authority in the latter
instance. See Town of Christianburg v. Montgomery County, 216 Va. 654, 658, 222 S.E.2d
513, 516 (1976).
139. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 523 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1167.1 (Cure. Supp. 1983)).
140. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1167.1(7) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
141. City of Fredericksburg v. County of Spotsylvania (Va. Annex. Ct., Apr. 26, 1983)
(Order of Annexation), appeal denied, Citizens for a Better Agreement v. City of Freder-
icksburg and County of Spotsylvania, No. 83-1215 (Va. Nov. 17, 1983).
142. Id.
143. COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG -
COUNTY OF SPOTSYLVANIA ANNEXATION AND IMMUNITY AGREEMENT (June 1982) [hereinafter
cited as ANNEXATION AND IMMUNITY AGREEMENT].
144. Id. at 3.
145. City of Fredericksburg v. County of Spotsylvania (Va. Annex. Ct., Feb. 14, 1983)
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The court ruled that it had jurisdiction to decide only the necessity and
expediency of the proposed annexation. 14  The court advanced two argu-
ments for this position. First, an annexation court is not a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction, but rather a statutory court of limited jurisdiction. Thus,
the court had no express authority to review agreements. Second, the
court refused to approve or disapprove the agreement because to do so
would be to give an -impermissible advisory opinion in a case where no
controversy involving the agreement had arisen. 4' As a result, the annex-
ation court issued its Order of Annexation on April 26, 1983 approving
the necessity and expediency of the annexation, but refusing to approve
or disapprove the agreement. 4 s
On July 25, 1983, a petition for appeal was filed in the Virginia Su-
preme Court by intervenors seeking to overturn the court's holding con-
cerning its lack of jurisdiction to review voluntary agreements. 4 9 In addi-
tion to seeking relief on the jurisdictional issue, the intervenors also
challenged the validity of the agreement's provision calling for a twenty-
five year moratorium on annexation by the city. 50 The thrust of the in-
tervenors' complaint on the latter point was that in ten or fifteen years
Spotsylvania County's population will be sufficient so that it may apply
for total immunity."5 ' Therefore, the agreement's provisions which would
have banned annexation for a period of twenty-five years were tanta-
mount to foreclosing annexation permanently.' 5' The intervenors con-
tended that the agreement was ultra vires under the Dillon Rule. 15' As
previously stated, the Dillon Rule is a canon of strict construction which
prohibits local governments from exercising any authority which is not
expressly conferred, or necessarily or fairly implied from the terms of a
statute.5 Any doubts as to the existence of such authority will be con-
strued against its existence. 155 The intervenors argued that the economic
growth-sharing statute conferred no such authority on local governments
(Memorandum Opinion).
146. See Petition for Appeal at 7, Citizens for a Better Agreement v. City of Fredericks-
burg and County of Spotsylvania, No. 83-1215 (Va. July 25, 1983).
147. Id. at 7-8.
148. City of Fredericksburg v. County of Spotsylvania (Va. Annex. Ct., Apr. 26, 1983)
(Order of Annexation).
149. Petition for Appeal at 2-3, Citizens for a Better Agreement v. City of Fredericksburg
and County of Spotsylvania, No. 83-1215 (Va. July 25, 1983).
150. Id. at 3-4.
151. Id. at 16; Interview with Ted McCormack, Assistant to the Director, Commission on
Local Government (Aug. 4, 1983). See also ANNEXATION AND IMMUNITY AGREEMENT, supra
note 143, at 64-65.
152. Petition for Appeal at 16, Citizens for a Better Agreement v. City of Fredericksburg
and County of Spotsylvania, No. 83-1215 (Va. July 25, 1983).
153. Id. at 25-27.
154. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
155. See Commonwealth v. County Board of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 576-77, 232
S.E.2d 30, 42 (1977).
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to agree to annexation moratoriums. 56
Although the petition for appeal was subsequently denied by the
court,167 the two issues in the case - the scope of judicial review of vol-
untary agreements and the cities' authority to relinquish their right to
annexation for a specified period of time by agreement - made the ap-
peal in the Fredericksburg case one of considerable interest to the practi-
tioner who negotiates these types of agreements. Had the appeal been
granted, it would have been the first case the Virginia Supreme Court
heard concerning the validity of a voluntary agreement and the scope of
judicial review since the enactment of the 1979 amendments. It is perhaps
unfortunate that the court refused the petition for appeal; however, the
absence of statutory authority that gave rise to the Fredericksburg case
was remedied by the General Assembly in 1983 through enactment of a
new provision governing voluntary agreements.
This newly promulgated voluntary agreement provision, effective July
1, 1983, specifically confers authority on annexation courts to review vol-
untary agreements and either grant or withhold their approval. 15 The
courts are not, however, given authority to make changes in the agree-
ments absent the consent of both parties. In deciding whether to approve
or disapprove the agreements, the courts are directed to consider the best
interests of the state and the parties. Other factors to be considered in-
clude whether the agreement promotes the orderly growth and continued
viability of local governments. 59 Additionally, the General Assembly ex-
pressly authorized cities to enter into agreements giving up their annexa-
tion rights for a specified period of time. 60
Of greater importance to localities that entered into voluntary agree-
ments before the 1983 amendments is a provision which provides that
voluntary agreements previously entered into are deemed to be valid
under the terms of the new statute.'6 ' The general rule is that statutes
are to be applied prospectively unless the clear expression and intent of
the legislature is otherwise.' 6 ' Here, the statute contains a clear expres-
sion of legislative intent that it should be applied retrospectively.
6 3
156. Petition for Appeal at 26, Citizens for a Better Agreement v. City of Fredericksburg
and County of Spotsylvania, No. 83-1215 (Va. July 25, 1983). But see 1982-83 Op. Va. Att'y
Gen. 151 (stating that such authority may be fairly implied from the words of VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-945.7 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
157. Citizens for a Better Agreement v. City of Fredericksburg and County of Spotsylva-
nia, No. 83-1215 (Va. Nov. 17, 1983) (appeal denied).
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1167.1(5) (Cure. Supp. 1983).
159. Id.
160. See id. § 15.1-1167.1(2).
161. See id. § 15.1-1167.1(7).
162. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 169 Va. 77, 85-87, 192 S.E. 774, 776-77 (1937).
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1167.1(7) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (providing in pertinent part that
any voluntary agreements which "(i) [have] been previously entered into or (ii) which [have]
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Therefore, Fredericksburg's agreement not to initiate annexation pro-
ceedings for twenty-five years is a valid exercise of express authority con-
ferred by the new provisions governing voluntary agreements and the an-
nexation court may properly review the agreement."6 4
B. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg6 5
Rockingham is the only reported case on annexation since the 1979
amendments were adopted. Additionally, it is the first case to be decided
by the Virginia Supreme Court since the annexation moratorium was
lifted on July 1, 1980.166 Rockingham is significant because it gave the
supreme court the opportunity to examine many of the provisions of the
1979 amendments. In fact, the court granted the appeal for just such an
opportunity.16
7
Rockingham did not involve a voluntary settlement agreement. In this
respect it is reflective of pre-1979 annexation suits. The City of Harrison-
burg sought to annex over fourteen square miles of Rockingham
County.16 The Commission on Local Government reviewed the proposed
annexation and recommended that it be granted with certain limita-
tions.169 The annexation court found the proposal to be necessary and
expedient, and ordered the annexation of 11.64 square miles of territory
from Rockingham County.17 0 The county appealed and the major ques-
tion on appeal was whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the
annexation was necessary and expedient.1 7 1
The court examined the changes and the relevant legislative history of
the 1979 amendments and reached five conclusions which are among the
court's most important pronouncements in the case:
First, the state favors cooperation, rather than competition, among local
governments. Second, annexation courts must balance the interests of the
people in all the areas concerned. Third, annexation may not be warranted
where urbanized counties already provide adequate urban services. Fourth,
the state's interest in maintaining strong local governments is an important
been reviewed or [are] in the process of review by the Commission on Local Government, or
(iii) which [have] been or [are] the subject of review by a special court convened under
Chapter 26.2 of this title" are deemed to be in compliance with the terms of § 15.1-1167.1).
164. Id. § 15.1-1167.1(2), (5), (7).
165. 224 Va. 62, 294 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
166. See supra note 32.
167. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. at 69, 294 S.E.2d at 827.
168. COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE CITY OF HARRISONBURG -
COUNTY OF ROCKINGHAM ANNEXATION CASE 8 (Feb. 1981).
169. Id. at 43. See County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. at 70, 294
S.E.2d at 827.
170. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. at 70, 294 S.E.2d at 827.
171. Id. at 74, 294 S.E.2d at 830.
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consideration. Fifth, the findings and recommendations of an impartial ad-
ministrative agency will help to protect and promote that interest.'
The court's fourth conclusion describes the state-interest standard
which was added to the annexation test by the 1979 amendments." 3 The
court interpreted the state-interest standard to be a significant addition
to the necessity and expediency test and held that the purpose of the
standard was to emphasize that annexation is more than a purely local
question.174
Other pronouncements in the case involved overruling prior case law.
The state's previous policy that urban areas should be governed by city
governments and rural areas should be governed by county govern-
ments1 5 was no longer the law after the 1979 amendments. As such, the
court overruled prior case law to the contrary. 17 However, the court made
it clear that previous case law in other areas was still valid after the 1979
amendments. For example, the rule that the wishes of residents of the
area to be annexed do not control the granting of an annexation177 and
the rule that no single factor controls in determining the necessity and
expediency of annexation 178 remain valid.
In Rockingham, the Virginia Supreme Court also addressed the issues
of city-county cooperation in the joint provision of services and the ad-
verse impact of annexation on a county. With respect to the providing of
services, the Virginia Code provides that any arbitrary refusal by a city or
county to cooperate in a joint undertaking to provide services will be held
against that party in a subsequent annexation proceeding.17 9 Conversely,
the Code directs the annexation court not to draw any adverse inference
from joint activities undertaken by the two localities. The purpose of this
provision is to promote cooperative ventures among adjoining political
subdivisions of the state. 8 ' In this instance, Rockingham County charged
that Harrisonburg had acted arbitrarily.' 8' The issue was in defining "ar-
bitrary." The court found a mutual lack of cooperation between the par-
ties, but stated that each party had "been looking out for their own inter-
172. Id.
173. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
174. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. at 85, 294 S.E.2d at 837.
175. See supra note 46.
176. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. at 76, 294 S.E.2d at 831-32.
177. Id. at 77, 294 S.E.2d at 832 (citing County of Henrico v. City of Richmond, 177 Va.
754, 788-89, 15 S.E.2d 309, 321 (1941); accord County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186
Va. 1032, 1041, 45 S.E.2d 136, 140 (1947)).
178. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. at 80, 294 S.E.2d at 834
(citing County of Fairfax v. Town of Fairfax, 201 Va. 362, 368, 111 S.E.2d 428, 433 (1959)).
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(bl)(v) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
180. Id.
181. County of Rockingham v. City of Harrisonburg, 224 Va. at 81, 294 S.E.2d at 834-35.
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ests as they perceive them. ' 18 2 The court concluded that "[a]ctions
prompted by a reasonable perception of legitimate self-interest are not
arbitrary.1113
With respect to the adverse impact of annexation, the court found that
annexation usually harms the county initially.18 4 But the court specifically
held that the county's ability and potential for future development after
annexation was a relevant consideration in determining the adverse im-
pact on the county. Thus, the court rejected Rockingham County's argu-
ment that the so-called "growback" theory had been disapproved in ear-
lier opinions of the court.'8 5
The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately held the proposed annexation
to be necessary and expedient.' In the process, the court rubber-
stamped the judgment of the annexation court. This case may presage a
future deference to the findings of the annexation court, but two facts
would tend to imply otherwise. First, the supreme court routinely defers
to an annexation court's findings of fact, but it may disregard the annexa-
tion court's findings of fact if it believes them to be plainly wrong.'8 7 Sec-
ond, the supreme court traditionally has not deferred to the annexation
court's determination of necessity and expediency where it believed the
latter was in error.18 8
C. Problems In Partial Immunity Actions and Legislative Solutions
In December, 1982, the Commission on Local Government issued its
first report on a partial immunity action filed under the Virginia Code
amendments. 8 9 Under the relevant provisions of the statute, a county can
be granted partial immunity from annexation if it can demonstrate to the
court that appropriate urban-type services are being provided to the parts
of the county for which immunity is sought. 90 The case before the Com-
mission involved the County of Augusta's request for partial immunity
for approximately 38.2 square miles of territory adjacent to the cities of
182. Id. at 81-82, 294 S.E.2d at 835.
183. Id. at 82, 294 S.E.2d at 835.
184. Id. at 84, 294 S.E.2d at 836.
185. Id. at 84 n.12, 294 S.E.2d at 836 n.12.
186. Id. at 85, 294 S.E.2d at 837.
187. See e.g., City of Alexandria v. County of Fairfax, 212 Va. 437, 440, 184 S.E.2d 758,
760 (1971); Johnston v. County of Fairfax, 211 Va. 378, 384, 177 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1970).
188. See, e.g., City of Roanoke v. County of Roanoke, 214 Va. 216, 198 S.E.2d 780 (1973);
Rockingham County v. Town of Timberville, 201 Va. 303, 110 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
189. COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON THE COUNTY OF AUGUSTA PARTIAL
IMMUNITY ACTION 13 (Dec. 1982) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON PARTIAL IMMUNITY Ac-
TION]. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.22:1 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983) (stating
partial immunity provisions).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
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Staunton and Waynesboro.191 The Commission reviewed the type and
level of services being provided in the area being proposed for immunity
and those of the cities of Staunton and Waynesboro. The Commission
found that comparable urban-type services were not being provided in
the area proposed for immunity, nor was there a greater community of
interest with Augusta County than with either city.19 2 The Commission
also found that Augusta County had not fully complied with state policies
with respect to public planning, and therefore the Commission was una-
ble to recommend that partial immunity be granted.193
The importance of the Augusta County case lies in two areas: (1) the
definition of "comparable" urban-type services, and (2) the ability of the
court and Commission to grant or recommend a greater or lesser area
than that proposed for immunity by the county. In the first area, the
problem the Commission had was whether to define "comparable" urban-
type services as "equal," "approximately equal," or to use some other
standard.194 The applicable provision in the Code does not define the
term.19 5 A majority of the Commission members agreed that the services
provided in the area proposed for immunity must "approximate" the ser-
vices provided in the neighboring cities.196 Although the Commission
unanimously agreed that complete equality was not required, 97 two
members dissented from the majority's interpretation of the meaning of
comparable services. One member took the position that comparable ser-
vices were "only those services that are necessary to meet the needs of the
people being served . ,, ss Under this view, a county should not at-
tempt to provide the same or approximate level of services as nearby cit-
ies when to do so would be to provide a level of services far beyond what
is needed; such a policy would be irresponsible and economically un-
sound.19 9 The issue seems to be resolved since the majority agreed upon
the "approximate" equality standard.200 Using this standard, which is
more rigid than that advocated by the dissent, the Commission denied
Augusta County's request for partial immunity.20 1
The denial of Augusta County's request raised a second problem. Sev-
eral Commission members believed that portions of the area for which
191.See REPORT ON PARTIAL IMMUNITY ACTION, supra note 189, at 1.
192. Id. at 125.
193, Id. at 126.
194. Id. at 134-36 (Hensley, Comm'r, dissenting).
195. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-977.22:1 (Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
196. See REPORT ON PARTIAL IMMUNITY ACTION, supra note 189, at 129. (Beck, Comm'r,
dissenting).
197. Id. at 134-35 (Hensley, Comm'r, dissenting).
198. Id. at 134 (Hensley, Comm'r, dissenting).
199. Id. at 135 (Hensley, Comm'r, dissenting).
200. Id. at 129 (Beck, Comm'r, dissenting).
201. Id. at 125.
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immunity was sought provided a comparable level of urban-type ser-
vices. 2 02 However, the Commission could not recommend that immunity
be granted to a lesser area than that for which immunity was sought. At
the time of the Augusta County case, there was no statutory authority
that would allow the Commission to recommend or allow the annexation
court to grant any greater or lesser area than that proposed by the
county.2 0 3 This flaw in the 1979 amendments was corrected in 1983.204
Now the annexation court can grant and the Commission can recommend
a greater or smaller area than the area for which partial immunity is
sought. 05 Interestingly, the Commission was not given the same express
authority in annexation cases. 206 This may have been because of legisla-
tive oversight or a belief by the legislature that such authority is implied
from the terms of the statute.20 1 As a remedial statute, such authority
could be implied.2 0 8 A preferable solution, however, would be to make the
Commission's authority express. In any event, it was unnecessary to con-
fer similar express authority on the courts in annexation cases because
they previously had received and exercised such authority.209
The County of Augusta has chosen not to pursue its partial immunity
request in the annexation court.2 10
V. CONCLUSION
It will be many more years before the impact of the 1979 amendments
can be fully assessed. The clearest trend to date has been the movement
towards voluntary settlement of annexation disputes. Some of the defects
and omissions in the 1979 revision of the annexation laws were remedied
by amendmends in 1983. However, the annexation process in Virginia re-
mains in a state of study and revision and will continue to be for the
foreseeable future. It can be said, however, that the 1979 amendments
202. Id. at 129 (Beck, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 132-33, 137-38 (Hensley, Comm'r,
dissenting).
203. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-945.7, -977.22:1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
204. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 217 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-945.7, -977.22:1 (Cum.
Supp. 1983)).
205. Id.
206. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 217 specifies immunity actions and does not specifically mention
annexation cases. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-945.7 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
207. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-945.7 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
208. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
209. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042(a) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
210. The City of Staunton and Augusta County reached agreement on March 22, 1983, to
study consolidation of the two jurisdictions. The City of Waynesboro received a report in
July, 1983 from the Commission on Local Government recommending the annexation by
Waynesboro of 6.23 square miles of Augusta County. The annexation court has yet to be
appointed. Nardi & Gordon, Waynesboro Backed in Annexation Effort, Richmond Times-
Dispatch, July 9, 1983, at B1, col. 4.
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ushered in a new era of cooperation in city-county relations. If measured
solely by this achievement, the 1979 amendments have been a success.
Robert E. Spicer, Jr.

